RSPRC Publication

Can the past teach us anything about how to achieve an environmentally sustainable and fair society?

Alfonso MARTÍNEZ ARRANZ, Ph.D., Monash University Researcher 

"Learn from the past" is a common admonishment. However, trying to draw lessons from the past in an era of rapid changes is a difficult and perhaps questionable task. In fact, it is also a common realisation that the multifaceted transitions in multiple sectors towards an environmentally sustainable and fair society ("the Transitions" for short) is completely unprecedented in its speed, scale, and purposefulness.

This essay argues that we can clarify where the past may help if we answer three questions: on our goals, our specific focus for comparison and on the relevant differences.Below we answer these three questions, dwelling most on the differences between past and present transitions. Then, we propose several research areas where drawing lessons from the past might be most fruitful.

1. What are the goals of the Transitions?

This paper chooses—without pausing to justify this choice for lack of space —an understanding of the Transitions between a "reform" and a "transformation" of current practices. The Transition should minimize development of nature out of respect for both the needs of future generations and natures intrinsic value[1].

2. What Transition are we focusing on?

Climate change mitigation requires us to diminish emissions from the current electricity sector by almost 85% worldwide. In addition, we expect other sectors, such as transport and industry, to be hooked up to the electricity supply to facilitate or even just allow their own decarbonisation [2]. The energy sector thus serves as an important example of transition, which nonetheless does not cover all Transitions (cf. food production or forestry), and may itself be understood as deriving from many transitions.

3. What the key differences are between the challenges of this Transition and those of past transitions.

Many have tried drawing lessons from past energy transitions, but the comparison is often done without a systematic reflection on the different needs and goals of the current transition [3-5]. The rest of the paper ponders these differences and ends up considering what analogies to look for in past human experience to enlighten the present transition.

 

What are the key differences between past and future energy systems?
The energy system, same as any other technological system, is not just made of artefacts. We operate it within the constraints of physics, according to our own laws, and for our purposes. Thus, we discuss the differences between past and future energy systems in both technical and human terms. These sections highlight the key issues and our knowledge gaps, which will then be summarised in the questions to ask of past experience.

Technical elements
Looking at the past, we see the multiplication of energy availability through new inventions (such as steam or internal combustion engines) and may be tempted to hope that another such invention will come to unlock yet more energy. However, most future estimates assume modest improvements in technology over time and no breakthroughs. Indeed, one well-established lesson from history—which resonates with basic logic—is that, while innovation can deliver radical changes, it must build on previous successes [6]. This means that a complex and immature technology such as nuclear fusion, which would provide even denser energy than fossil fuels, will not be here tomorrow and likely not for decades still, if ever. This is the first reason why the present Transition will struggle maintaining present energy levels.

A less ambitious invention, carbon capture and storage, could in theory make things easier by allowing further use of fossil fuels (even if most would still have to stay in the ground) [7]. In practice, its technical hurdles put widespread commercialisation at least 20 years away [8]; thus, it is unlikely to help soon enough, at least in the electricity sector. This is a second reason why increasing consumption will be very difficult. Luckily, while less energy dense than fossil fuels, renewable energy sources are abundant enough for present human purposes[9] and a system using them exclusively would be reliable[2]. As an added bonus, this transition should help improve other environmental indicators [10].

However, there are two crucial hurdles on the path to completely replacing fossil fuels: the overall material requirements, and the speed and scale of the replacement. The former is not a trivial issue and one that is seldom considered. Yet a recent analysis suggests that alternatives exist for the materials whose reserves could be quickly exhausted [11]. In addition, comprehensive recycling is conceivable at a reasonable cost [12, 13], although it is yet to be mandated [14]. By contrast, considering the scale of the ramp-up paints a less rosy picture. Installing enough solar panels, wind turbines, etc. within 35 years to cover most current fossil fuel consumption—i.e. not just in electricity generation but transport and industry as well—would be an unparalleled industrial feat. The only common comparison is the US war production effort after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941—but lasting 10 times as long [2, 15]. This is the second reason why significant overall growth in energy consumption is unrealistic until the energy transition is complete and climate change mastered. This has important economic implications discussed further below.

 

Human elements

At the individual level, our most basic needs have probably remained the same throughout history: 2500 calories of food and reasonable shelter from the environment. The world should be able to feed the 9 to 10 billion at which human population will likely peak during the 21st century [16]. The need for heating and, particularly, cooling is a large but potentially manageable challenge, too [17]. In light of this, sustainability is obviously also about the population question. Lower population would make these (and our other) problems far easier to manage. Therefore, current trends and measures of "family planning" should be encouraged and expanded, confronting irresponsible economic and religious dogmas. However, limiting population more strictly would be difficult to implement, particularly because this extreme measure would only work if it targeted rich and not just poor people.

This is why beliefs and behaviours are the key. There are many ways to fulfil the upper levels Maslows hierarchy of needs, i.e. "belonging" and "self-realisation". The basic capitalist recipe is simply increased consumption: if you already own a TV, a computer and travel by car, you should buy a flat-screen TV, a tablet and travel by plane; now you can buy meat, you should eat it every day, etc. This has long been known to be futile, but we have stuck with it [18]. We could certainly align our higher goals better with the aims of sustainability. However, we understand few of the triggers of our psychology as it relates to "pro-environmental behaviours" [19], let alone about changing beliefs.

At the societal level, Ulrich Beck and his collaborators have long argued that our contemporary "risk society" is changing in fundamental ways[20, 21]: capital and trade globalisation are undermining the nation-state, individualization and flexible employment are complicating the idea of "class", which together with changing gender roles are challenging the institution of family. Last but not least the rising importance of cross-border issues—including climate change—create an increasing cosmopolitan population and cosmopolitan politics. However, while these trends may exist, it is doubtful how much they have solidified [22]. Most importantly for our purposes, the role of the nation-state, while changing, remains a key reference point for the sustainability transition [23], as seen in normal practice at the G20, the UN Climate Convention and even the European Union.

At the same societal level, even if avoiding "bads" is acquiring importance relative to securing "goods" [24], the issue of inequalities of distribution seems prominent. Inequality has been more or less a constant through human history, except in industrialised countries from roughly 1950 to 1980. In this "trente glorieuses", as the French call them, a combination of high growth and high taxes significantly narrowed the wealth gap, also because big fortunes had been destroyed in the World Wars and the 1929 crash [25].

However, as noted above, technical factors severely constrain energy consumption growth. This will in turn constrain economic growth[26, 27]. A recurrent argument used to argue for unfettered growth is that we can "decouple" these two. This argument draws inspiration from the misleading progress in "relative decoupling". Through an increase in efficiency, the average energy and materials used to produce an additional unit of GDP has been decreasing from year to year across the world [28]. However, ultimately, any additional product will always require additional energy and materials, even with highest possible technical efficiency, full recycling and no "rebound effect" [29]. "Absolute decoupling" is impossible; therefore, the higher economic growth is, the more difficult the energy transition becomes. A concrete example is information technologies, which are praised for their potential to increase efficiency, reduce need for transport, etc. They themselves still rely on physical components, such as smartphones and data centres. These require mining/recycling minerals and energy [30]. Thus, if ICT grows rapidly, we cannot let other parts of the economy simply "grow more efficiently" because the end effect would be a level of growth our limited energy resources may not be able to support.

 

What should we research?

On the one hand, fossil fuel consumption must come down fast but renewables cannot simultaneously replace and provide significant additional energy supply growth. Ultimately, this imposes limits on economic growth for at least the next few decades of transition. On the other hand, there are currently enormous and increasing differences in material endowments within and across countries. In the absence of the possibility of further exponential economic growth, achieving greater global equality will mean significant redistribution, perhaps on an unprecedented scale. It may even force us to reassess of our concept of "wealth" and "progress". However, we lack much knowledge regarding how to trigger and encourage pro-environmental behaviours, precisely at a time when a massive mobilisation for sustainability should take place.

Taking the above into account, some crucial questions are as follows. Further below we consider how they may or may not be answered by history:

1. How do we guarantee that new energy-related inventions are quickly and efficiently distributed?
2. How do we alter peoples interactions to energy-consuming devices: their cars, their air conditioning, etc.?
3. How do we mobilise our population and economy for energy conservation and without the spur of massive conflict?
4. How do we achieve greater equality in access to a service (such as energy provision) with modest rates of growth while undergoing technological change?

Caveats apply when trying to answer these questions by drawing on the past. Answers to the first one derived from any era prior to the ICT revolution risk sounding rather silly today; however, there may be something to learn from the ICT revolution itself. The second question might be better answered through direct psychological experimentation. However, the third and fourth, because of their sheer scale, may particularly benefit from a reflexion rooted on past experiences.

 

Related publications by the author
Martínez Arranz, A. (2015) "Carbon capture and storage in the EU: frames and blind spots", Energy Policy, Volume 82, July 2015, Pages 249–259.
Martínez Arranz A. (2015) "Fear and Loathing in Gas Vegas: Countering Russias Gas Gambles in Asia with EU Climate Policy", The SPEAR, FU Berlin. URL: http://www.asianperceptions.eu/nfg-blog/fear-and-loathing-gas-vegas-countering-russia%E2%80%99s-gas-gambles-asia-eu-climate-policy.
Martínez Arranz, A. and G. Wacker (2015) "EU – China relations: High Hopes, Clear Conflicts" in Witzleb, N., A. Martínez Arranz, P. Winand (eds.), European Union and Global Engagement: Institutions, Policies and Challenges, Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.
Martínez Arranz, A. (2015) "Environmental Policy Integration" in Witzleb, N., A. Martínez Arranz, P. Winand (eds.), European Union and Global Engagement: Institutions, Policies and Challenges, Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.
Martínez Arranz, A. (2011) "A Holistic Approach to Energy Security: Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency", in P. Winand and Goldsmith, L. (eds.) Energy and the Environmental Challenge: Lessons from the European Union and Australia, Brussels: PIE-Peterlang.


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